Measuring Polarization in Preferences by Can, Burak et al.
Measuring Polarization in Preferences
Burak Can, Ali Ihsan Ozkes, Ton Storcken
To cite this version:
Burak Can, Ali Ihsan Ozkes, Ton Storcken. Measuring Polarization in Preferences. cahier de
recherche 2014-14. 2014. <hal-00998513>
HAL Id: hal-00998513
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00998513
Submitted on 2 Jun 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
  
 
 
 
MEASURING POLARIZATION IN PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
Burak CAN 
Ali Ihsan OZKES 
Ton STORCKEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cahier n° 2014-14 
 
 
 
 
                              ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE                         
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
 
 
DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIE 
Route de Saclay 
91128 PALAISEAU CEDEX 
(33) 1 69333033 
http://www.economie.polytechnique.edu/ 
mailto:chantal.poujouly@polytechnique.edu 
 
 
Measuring Polarization in Preferences
Burak Can∗ Ali Ihsan Ozkes† Ton Storcken‡
May 19, 2014
Abstract
In this paper, we study the measurement of polarization in collective
decision making problems with ordinal preferences over alternatives. We
argue that polarization can be measured as an aggregation of antagonisms
over pairs of alternatives in the society. We propose a measure of this sort
and show that it is the only measure satisfying some normatively appealing
conditions.
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1 Introduction
Higher polarization in ideologies or preferences over policies is generally con-
sidered as a bad feature in politics mainly due to representational concerns. It
is argued to cause policy gridlock (Jones (2001)), decrease turnout if it is only
in elite level (Hetherington (2008)) and increase economic inequality (McCarty
et al. (2003)).
Due to the disagreements in measurement, we see disparity in the results
of polarization analyses. For instance, the increase in polarization in the U.S.
politics is somewhat unequivocal for the elite level although the literature on
public polarization is inconclusive. For a review in line with this conclusion, see
Hetherington (2009). This paper introduces yet another approach to the mea-
surement of polarization. However, the major component of our contribution is
in that of the subject of measurement. Although there are quite a number of
articles analyzing the measurement of polarization for distributions that can be
represented on a line1, this paper is among the very first attempts for analyzing
polarization measures for ordinal preference profiles.2
Some of the related concepts that could be found analyzed in the social choice
literature could be listed as consensus (Herrera-Viedma et al., 2011), assent
(Baldiga and Green, 2013) and cohesiveness (Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz, 2013).
According to numerous authors, as formulated in Bosch (2006), consensus can be
formulated such that it can be measured with mappings that assign to any profile
of preferences a value in unit interval, which has the following two properties
necessarily: first, the value given to a profile is highest, namely 1, if and only
if all individuals agree on how to rank alternatives and second, the same value
given to any two profiles if the only difference in between them is the names
of either the alternatives or individuals. Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2008) have
introduced some axiomatic characterizations in this vein. Garc´ıa-Lapresta and
Pe´rez-Roma´n (2011) analyze properties of a class of consensus measures that
are based on the distances among individual weak orders.
1See, inter alia, Esteban and Ray (1994) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
2For a measure of ordinal preference polarization which adopts the methodology of Esteban
and Ray (1994) with the use of a metric a` la Kemeny (1959), see Ozkes (2013).
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Baldiga and Green (2013) define conflict between two individuals as the dis-
agreement in their top choices. They then use an aggregate-assent maximizing
approach to the selection of the choice rule, where the assent between prefer-
ences is the probability that these preferences would be conflictual on a random
feasible set.
Finally, Alcalde-Unzu and Vorsatz (2013) denote the level of similarity
among preferences in a profile as cohesiveness and characterize a class of co-
hesiveness measures with a set of plausible axioms. This class of functions falls
within the above definition of consensus.
In what follows we argue, first, that polarization is not necessarily the oppo-
site of consensus and hence calls for a particular treatment. The least polarized
case naturally coincides with a fully consensual state, which is easily defined
as a unanimous preference profile. However, there is no unique way of framing
the most polarized situation. This would entail a normative approach, which we
embrace in this paper as follows. Since we investigate polarization in preferences
that are represented as linear orders, we restrict the most polarized situations to
societies which are divided equally into two completely opposite linear orders.
Second, we impose that the polarization level should not depend on the
number of individuals in a society but stay the same if the supporting individuals
of each preference is multiplied by equal terms. Furthermore, we require a
form of equal treatment of marginal changes in the composition of preferences.
More precisely, if a single individual changes her preference to conform with
the majority view on a single issue, then the change in polarization should
not depend on the size of this majority. Finally, we impose neutrality towards
alternatives.
In this paper, we show that interpreting polarization as an aggregation of
antagonisms in a society is the only way of measuring polarization with the
properties above. In this context antagonisms are taken as disagreements over
pairwise comparisons of alternatives.
We proceed as follows. In the next section we introduce basic notations and
formal definitions regarding the axiomatic model. Section 3 provides our main
results and proofs thereof. We conclude in Section 4 by pointing to a possible
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direction for further research. We show the logical independence of axioms in
the appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Preliminaries
Let A be a finite and nonempty set of m alternatives. For any finite and
nonempty set of individuals N , and for any individual i in N , let p(i) denote
the preference of i in terms of a linear order, i.e., a complete, antisymmetric and
transitive binary relation on A. Furthermore, p indicates a profile, a combina-
tion of such individual preferences and L the set of all preferences on A. So, p
is an element of LN .
We denote by A¯ the set of all subsets of A with cardinality 2. For a given
profile p in LN and different alternatives a and b in A let nab(p) denote the
number of individuals who prefer a to b, i.e., nab(p) = #{i ∈ N : (a, b) ∈ p(i)}.
Let dab(p) = |nab(p)−nba(p)| denote the absolute difference between the number
of voters preferring a to b and those preferring b to a at profile p.
For a preference R, let RN denote the unanimous profile where all individuals
have preference R. Let −R = {(y, x) : (x, y) ∈ R} be the preference where all
pairs in R are reversed. If pi denotes a permutation on A, then the permuted
preference of R is piR = {(pi(a), pi(b)) : (a, b) ∈ R} which naturally defines the
permuted profile pip in a coordinate-wise manner, i.e., (pip)(i) = pi(p(i)).
For two profiles p and q of two disjoint sets of individuals, say N1 and N2
respectively, let (p, q) denote the profile, say r, such that r(i) = p(i) if i is in N1
and r(i) = q(i) if i is in N2. Similarly define p
2 = (p, p) to be a profile where
preference p is replicated once and p3 = (p, p, p) twice, and so on.
Let p and q be two profiles in LN . We say that p and q form an elementary
change from ab to ba whenever there is an individual i in N who ranks a and
b consecutively in p and furthermore q(i) =
(
p(i) ∪ {(b, a)}
)
\ {(a, b)} and for
all j in N \ {i}, p(j) = q(j). This means that q(i) can be obtained from p(i) by
only reversing the ordered pair (a, b).
Finally, a polarization measure Ψ assigns to any profile p in LN a real number
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Ψ(p), where N is any finite and nonempty set of individuals. Next we discuss a
few normatively appealing conditions on the polarization measures.
2.2 Conditions on Polarization Measures
We first impose a regularity condition on polarization measures to normalize
between 0 and 1. The former value is reserved for profiles wherein each individ-
ual has the same preferences, i.e., a unanimous profile. In this regard, we see
the maximal consensus as a case of minimal polarization. However, we further-
more restrict the maximally polarized case. The profiles (with even number of
individuals) where half of the individuals have a preference R and the rest have
−R, for some R ∈ L are considered to be the maximally polarized profiles.
Regularity : Ψ(RN ) = 0 and Ψ(RN1 , (−R)N2) = 1 for all preferences R
and all finite and nonempty sets N1 and N2 of individuals such that N1 and N2
are disjoint and equal in size, i.e., #N1 = #N2.
Neutrality is a standard property in social choice. In this context, it requires
that a renaming of the alternatives does not change the polarization level.
Neutrality : Ψ(p) = Ψ(pip) for all permutations pi on A and all profiles p.
The following condition requires that when societies are replicated by some
positive integer, the polarization is unchanged. Note that this also implies
anonymity, i.e., renaming the individuals does not change the polarization level.
Formally:
Replication invariance : Ψ(pk) = Ψ(p) for all positive integers k, and all
profiles p.
Finally, we introduce our final condition which we call support independence.
This condition requires that elementary changes in favor of an alternative that
has a majoritarian support against another lead to identical changes in polar-
ization across profiles. For instance, if a majority of individuals agree that a is
better than b in each of the two profiles, then an increase in the support of a
over b should lead to the same amount of change in the polarization for both of
these profiles.
Support independence : Ψ(p)−Ψ(q) = Ψ(p̂)−Ψ(q̂) for any two elementary
changes p, q and p̂, q̂ both from ba to ab for some alternatives a and b with
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nab(p) ≥ n/2 and nab(p̂) ≥ n/2.
3 Result
Assume for simplicity that the issue in hand is a binary choice, that there are
only two alternatives. If the absolute difference between numbers of individuals
preferring a to b and b to a, i.e., dab, is 0, then the polarization should intuitively
be maximal. If this number is equal to n, then we have that everyone prefers
a over b or vice versa, a full agreement. Hence polarization should be minimal.
Therefore, the polarization can be related to n−dab. If we normalize by dividing
by n, then we have a bound on the polarization (between 0 and 1) therefore
regularity is also satisfied. For profiles on more than two alternatives, we iterate
this process over all pairs of distinct alternatives. Thereafter we normalize this
value with respect to the number of such pairs and the number of individuals.
Hence we obtain the following polarization measure:
Ψ∗(p) =
∑
{a,b}∈A¯
n− dab(p)
n · (m2 ) .
It is easy to verify that Ψ∗ satisfies the conditions introduced in Section 2.2.
In the sequel, we will show that it is indeed the only measure that satisfies these
conditions. Before, we discuss some features regarding elementary changes that
are instrumental in what follows.
Let p and q form an elementary change from ab to ba, so that nab(p)− 1 =
nab(q) and nba(p)+1 = nba(q). This change can be of one of the following three;
(i) a minority decrement if nab ≤ n/2,
(ii) a majority decrement if nab ≥ n/2 and
(iii) a swing if nab(p) > n/2 and nab(q) < n/2.
3
The first two changes are straightforward. For the third, consider the case where
4 individuals prefer a to b and 3 prefer b to a. An elementary change, in this
case, from ab to ba makes the former minority a majority.
3Hence nab(p) = nba(q).
6
Remark 1. Note that if p and q form an elementary change from ab to ba
that is a minority decrement, then q and p form an elementary change from
ba to ab that is a majority decrement. This duality allows us to construct the
forthcoming lemmas by focusing on either of the two first elementary changes.
The following Lemma shows that all minority decrements yield an equal
change in polarization regardless of what alternatives are involved. By Re-
mark 1, the result also holds for majority decrements. Let Ψ satisfy the four
conditions; regularity, neutrality, replication invariance and support indepen-
dence.
Lemma 1. Let p and q be a minority elementary change from ab to ba and let
p̂ and q̂ be a minority elementary change from xy to yx. We have
Ψ(p)−Ψ(q) = Ψ(p̂)−Ψ(q̂).
Proof. Let p{a,b} be the profile obtained from p by shifting a and b to the two
top positions for each individual while leaving preference between a and b as well
as those between alternative in A\{a, b} unchanged. That is for all individuals
i in N let p{a,b}(i) = p(i)|{a,b}2 ∪ ({a, b} × A\{a, b})∪ p(i)|(A\{a,b})2 . Similarly
define q{a,b}. Then by support independence we have
Ψ(p)−Ψ(q) = Ψ(p{a,b})−Ψ(q{a,b}).
Considering the permutation pi on A such that pi(a) = x, pi(x) = a, pi(b) = y,
pi(y) = b and pi(z) = z for all z ∈ A\{a, b, x, y} neutrality implies
Ψ(p{a,b})−Ψ(q{a,b}) = Ψ(pip{a,b})−Ψ(piq{a,b}).
Note that pip{a,b} and piq{a,b} are preferences at which the alternatives x and
y are in the two top position for every individual. Furthermore they form a
minority elementary change from xy to yx. Therefore support independence
implies
Ψ(pip{a,b})−Ψ(piq{a,b}) = Ψ(p̂)−Ψ(q̂).
So, all in all
Ψ(p)−Ψ(q) = Ψ(p̂)−Ψ(q̂).
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Next we prove that all minority elementary changes yield a decrease of po-
larization by α = 2
n·(m2 )
. By Remark 1, then, all elementary changes in majority
increase polarization by that same amount α.
Lemma 2. Let p and q be a minority elementary change from ab to ba. Then
Ψ(p)−Ψ(q) = 2
n · (m2 ) .
Proof. By Lemma 1 it is sufficient to prove that at some minority elementary
change, polarization decreases by α = 2
n·(m2 )
. Replication invariance implies that
we may assume that the set of individuals is even, that is n = 2 ·k. Consider any
two set of individuals #N1 = #N2 = k with N1∩N2 = ∅ and a combined set of
individuals N = N1 ∪ N2. Given any preference R, consider the following two
profiles (RN1 , (−R)N2) and RN . Note that there is a path of k · (m2 ) elementary
changes from the former to the latter. By regularity Ψ(RN1 , (−R)N2) = 1
Ψ(RN ) = 0. By Lemma 1, each step in this path cause the same change in
polarization, say α. Note that the amount of swaps from (−R) to R is (m2 ).
The number of individuals requiring this many swaps is n/2. Therefore each
elementary change should decrease the polarization by 2/n
(
m
2
)
.
We have shown that each minority (or majority) elementary change causes
the same amount of decrease (or increase) in the polarization. Next we show
that swing elementary changes does not affect the polarization level.
Lemma 3. Let p and q be a swing elementary change from ab to ba. Then
Ψ(p) = Ψ(q).
Proof. Consider the profiles p2, (p, q) and q2. Both p2 and (p, q) as well as q2
and (p, q) form minority elementary changes. The former pair from ab to ba the
latter pair from ba to ab. So, Ψ(p2) − Ψ(p, q) = α = Ψ(q2) − Ψ(p, q). Hence,
Ψ(p2) = Ψ(q2). Therefore by replication invariance we have Ψ(p) = Ψ(q).
Now we can state our main theorem.
Theorem 1. A polarization measure Ψ satisfies regularity, neutrality, replica-
tion invariance and support independence if and only if Ψ = Ψ∗.
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Proof. Assume Ψ satisfies the conditions. Take any preference R and consider
the profile RN . By regularity, Ψ(RN ) = Ψ∗(RN ) = 0. Any profile p in LN
can be acquired by a sequence of elementary changes beginning from RN by
minority decrements, majority decrements or swings. By Lemmas 2 and 3, the
increase (or decrease) induced by each of the elementary changes should be the
same. Hence for any p in LN , we conclude Ψ(p) = Ψ∗(p).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have modeled polarization as an aggregation of antagonisms
per issues within a profile. The polarization measure we introduce simply
check for each issue, i.e., pairwise comparison of alternatives, and compares
the strength of a majority versus minority. These pairwise comparisons on is-
sues are then aggregated and normalized to a real number between 0 and 1. The
measure is very intuitive and is characterized by a few plausible conditions.
There are many directions for future research. The relation between the
extent of polarization and the social aggregation outcomes would be a natural
route of inquiry. Gurer (2008) studies the Arrovian impossibilities when the
preferences in the society cluster, in some sense, around a preference, where it
is also conjectured that in a bipolar society the sum of the distances from the
two opposite clusters, around which the society is polarized, will be decisive
concerning whether we end up with possibilities. The analysis is dependent on
a metric-based approach to alienation between preferences. Thus, the relevance
of polarization measures based on pairwise comparisons of alternatives to social
aggregation outcomes is an open and immediate question one might ask.
Note that the current analysis treats pairs of alternatives impartially, i.e.,
every issue is of equal importance for polarization. Of course, in many real life
situations we may have differing weights on issues. Another question for future
research would be analyzing richer domains of preferences, e.g., weak orders, or
restricted ones, e.g., single-peaked domains which are politically relevant and
interesting.
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Appendix: Logical independence of axioms
Regularity: The following measure satisfies replication invariance, neutrality
and support independence but not regularity:
Ψ′(p) =
∑
{a,b}∈A¯
dab(p)
n
.
To show it satisfies the first three axioms is rather straightforward. To see
violation of regularity it would suffice to consider a unanimous profile.
Support independence: Consider the function
d¯ab(p) =
{
0 if dab(p) = 0
1 if dab(p) 6= 0.
Then the following measure satisfies neutrality, regularity and replication in-
variance but not support independence:
Ψ¯(p) =
∑
{a,b}∈A¯
1− d¯ab(p)(
m
2
) .
Neutrality is straightforward. Replication invariance is due to the fact that
d¯ab stays the same in case of replication. To see regularity, note that d¯ab(p) = 1
for all a, b ∈ A whenever p = RN for some R, hence we have 0. In the case where
p = (RN1 , (−R)N2) with #N1 = #N2, we have d¯ab(p) = 0 for all a, b ∈ A, hence
1 as the outcome of the function. To see why it fails support independence,
consider two profiles p, pˆ with 4 individuals:
p =
 i1 i2 i3 i4a a b b
b b a a
 pˆ =
 i1 i2 i3 i4a a b a
b b a b

Let q, (respectively qˆ) be constructed such that from p to q (respectively from
pˆ to qˆ), the third agent changes its preference to a over b. Support independence
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requires that the change of polarization should be the same for p, q and pˆ, qˆ,
which is not the case under Ψ¯.
Neutrality: For any set of alternatives A, let x, y ∈ A be a predefined choice
of pairs. The following measure satisfies replication invariance, regularity and
support independence but not neutrality:
Ψ˙(p) =
n− dxy(p)
n
Replication Invariance: Let m = 2, n = 3. We first construct a function
K¯ such that K¯(p) = 0 for all unanimous profiles, and K¯(p) = 1 for all other
profiles. Consider the measure below which for n = 3 and m = 2 equals K¯(p)
and in all other cases equals Ψ∗(p):
Ψˆ(p) =
{
K¯(p) if m = 2 and n = 3
Ψ∗(p) otherwise.
This measure satisfies neutrality, support independence, regularity but not
replication invariance.
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